Part 2: Agree to disagree?

So with Part 1 being all about the various discourses at play in regard to climate change and climate change policy, I came to the conclusion that agreeing upon an international policy is so slow because rather than combining the three types of discourses equally, different representatives and nations are trying to make their dominant discourse (America, economic) win, at the expense of the others.

So Part 2 hopes to focus on possible solutions to this problem. To be entirely honest, I think international delegates first of all need to take a course in People Management Skills. This description alone seems perfect: “With some employees, it isn’t a matter of ability, it’s a matter of attitude. And while you can’t control someone’s horrible personality, you can decide how you’re going to respond”. And it’s true. All too often, policies are being driven with the end goal to protect your own interests. At our COP21 workshop, we were trying to save the world but really, we were trying to save ourselves some money. 

There’s a couple of buzzwords that encompass what the international community are striving towards: ‘Sustainable Development’, ‘Ecological Modernisation’. Of these two, EM seems to be rapidly gaining popularity. As a discourse, it represents progressive change, and growth within ecological constraints. Technological innovation is a key factor within these themes, as is the balancing of economic growth and environmental health. While EM however gives the impression of united efforts to tackle climate change, it is scaled from weak to strong. Australia (as mentioned in the previous post) pursued a weak form, the ‘No Regrets’ Policy (Bulkeley 2001). Ultimately, Australia was unwilling (like many other nations) to jeopardise its economic growth or trade competitiveness through GHG reductions. This self-interest keeps cropping up. Current American political discourse is very much about protecting its competitive edge against the likes of China, and securing this edge through numerous avenues such as investing in fracking to limit dependence on Middle-Eastern sourced oil reserves. So effectively, under the pretence of the EM, countries are still doing minimal amounts to genuinely make moves toward combatting climate change.

Stronger EM on the other hand involves creating new institutional structures where the relationship between nature and society can be reconfigured (Christoff 1996). These structures, according to Mol &Sonnenfeld (2000) require the redesign and integration of the following: 1) science and technology, 2) market and state, 3) flexible governance, and 4) reformed ideologies concerning the environment and our consumption. This societal change is touched upon by many experts in the field (Rathzel &Uzzel 2011), and in my perspective, politicians are also citizens: if they are not crediting the environment with enough value, then how can they be trusted to make these big decisions?

All this to-and-froing between appropriate amounts of EM brings me onto the main aspect of this post: how the international community can successfully come together in agreement and support of effective change – effective being the key word there. The different types of governance on this issue of course include democratic governance. Deliberative democracy – where consensus decision-making and majority rule has the ability to produce ecological efficacy (Dryzek &Stevenson 2011). However, this has been happening and we haven’t moved far enough, primarily because, “unlike the global financial system where hegemony of a single-discourse prevails”, the UNFCC negotiations have a load of inflexible discourses at play. Like we experienced in our own COP21 workshop, it’s like a game of cards. There is an element of trust involved, but participating parties hide their hand and maintain reserved positions until the final stages of negotiation. In this way, deliberative democracy is not decisive enough, and the world is really falling behind on the necessary actions to combat climate change. 

As a result, there have been increasingly calls for a more authoritarian system of rule. Lovelock himself blames the democracy and its tendency toward inertia is the primary concern for lack of action taken on climate change. He compares the threat of global warming as severe as war, and mentions that "even the best democracies agree that when a major war approaches, democracy must be put on hold for the time being”. This sentiment has been echoed time and time again, particularly in Shearman & Smith (2007) who, while accepting that past and existing authoritarian societies have a record of environmental abuse, democracy is unable to reform in time to address the problems before they become irreversible. They draw on interesting examples such as fisheries management; proposed exclusion zones in the North Atlantic to prevent the crash of cod stocks were curtailed on the grounds of liberal democracy in the interest of ‘jobs now’. The other examples include the influence of religion; 200 Republican legislators (include my favourite James Inhofe) are Christian fundamentalists – it’s all in God’s plan!

Beeson (2010) is another critic of democracy (in regard to climate change action). Using the example of Southeast Asia, the bulk of his argument follows that in nations facing a range of issues such as rapid population growth, political tension, poor security, corruption, and environmental degradation, there is limited state capacity to deal with these consequences, and that realistically only authoritarian regimes are up to task.  Using the example of China, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ has been described by Ramo (2004) as a pragmatic approach to development that provides high economic growth under stable, albeit repressive politics. It is the repressiveness that is difficult to accept within the framework of Western democratic ideals of liberalism. And also within our framework is the notion that international relations are progressive. But ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) have actually legitimised authoritarian rule by their norms and diplomatic practices. Indeed, China’s status as the predominant industry and economic hub in the region sees it more and more 'willing to reinforce its economic clout with diplomatic leverage' (Shirk 2007).

Using the example of Fisheries Management again however, I believe it is possible to use different methods globally but to the same end goal. Jones (2014) provides four modes of governance for MPAs (Marine Protected Areas): 1) Government-led: usually for MEDC’s with a strong state capacity, well established legal and judicial systems, and a state-wide framework, 2) Decentralised: shared authority, particularly for LEDCs with a lesser state capacity but with the commitment to sustainability, 3) Community-led: on a smaller and more local scale, perhaps boosted by economic incentives from the state, and 4) Private: independent, effective, well managed, and with some government collaboration. Now even though these nodes are in relation to fisheries, I believe that they can be harnessed to address the environment too, especially through local initiatives.

Ultimately, we do need strong leadership at the international conferences to talk and come up with strategies about climate change. Personally, I’m suggesting penalties for countries who are ABLE to commit to certain levels of emissions reductions but who refuse to. I don’t know what kind of penalties, but they should be severe enough to kick-start nations into wanting to combat change. And once these international agreements have been settled upon, let those individual nations carry them out however they feel is most effective: as long as it works. In the West, it can be democratically. In the Southeast, it can be more authoritarian. The main issue is really the meetings like COP21 where agreements sufficient to make real change and reductions are not being met. I don't want to turn COP21 into a dictatorship, but currently countries are getting away with not agreeing to certain limits, or not ratifying policies. It's not good enough.